The Social Exchange and Choice Framework - PART 1
2
The Social Exchange and Choice
Framework
evin and Sarah
have been dating seriously for about 6 months.
X.Both agree that they have a close relationship with a
lot of warmth and support. After going to
a romantic movie, Kevin and Sarah go back to Kevin's apartment
and are in the middle of some pretty serious petting when Sarah
says, "Kevin, if we are going to do it, I
want you to use a condom. I have one in my purse." Kevin says, "Gosh, honey, are you serious? Don't you trust me? I
mean, it's not as though I have AIDS or
something." Sarah seems to be caught off guard and
pauses for a moment before responding. "Kevin, I know how you feel about
me, and I trust you, but a condom
makes good sense because it is easy for anyone
to pick up a sexually transmitted disease.
Some of these diseases are hard to detect and even harder to cure, especially for women. I don't want to end up not
being able to have children when I am ready to as
a result of carelessness." Kevin quickly
blurts, "But these things are so plastic. You know, Sarah, a guy doesn't feel anything if he wears one of those!"
Sarah's voice carries a tinge of anger or
bitterness. "Kevin, I wanted to make love with you,
but now I feel you are just after your own pleasure and don't really care about the possible consequences for me.
I'm the one who could get pregnant, I'm the
one who has to get an abortion or carry the
baby for 9 months, and in the end I am now the one who has to ask for a commonsense preventive measure that
would protect both of us." Kevin's tone
becomes disappointed but still angry. "Come
on, and I'll take you home."
This sketch of Kevin and Sarah's interaction provides us
with an illustration of two people pursuing
their self-interests. Kevin's self-interest is to maximize his sexual pleasure.
Sarah's self-interest is to avoid the costs associated with
unprotected sex. From this standpoint, often
callekttilitarianismAoth Kevin and Sarah are acting rationally, but they are operatififiCn different values. The essence
of utilitarianism is that individuals rationally
weigh the rewards and costs associated
with behavioral choices. They choose those activities that maximize their rewards.
Utilitarianism is a philosophical perspective that has
heavily influenced exchange theories in the
social sciences. The central focus of exchange
_is on motivation. Human beings are viewed as motivated out of self-interest. WEit does it mean to say t at
utilitarianism fiRilses on motiVffiai-IF
Motivation is what induces a person to act. The
focus, therefore, is on tieperson and what propels that person to choose,a..particular action. Theories inspired by
utilitarian thinking are based on the assumption of
individual self-interest. This in turn means
that we as social scientists can understand a person's actions by understanding the individual's interests or values. These
interests allow the individual to account
for both costs and rewards -and Make cVziiZg-th-arrrra5anuze
the-aCto-r'Sutility or profit. ThebaSic notion, then, is that—rafioriira-ciorS—Ctioe
a course of action that the ate si benefit.
Exchange thseaists usually explain the
existence and endurance of social groups such as the family---yby
theif-appeal to the
self-interest of
membeitAiidiii-duals come together in groups so
as to
their rewards. Of course, membership in social groups may
also necessitate compromise and even costs to the individual member. If the costs of group membership exceed the rewards, then membership in the group is no longer a rational choice. Thus,
the family group is usually conceptualized as
a source of rewards for the individual members.
Intellectual Traditions
Utilitarian thinking refers to several varieties of
theory. Some examples of utilitarian thinking are the
ethical utilitarianism of the Epicureans and
later Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, psychological hedonism, and the ideal utilitarianism of G. E. Moore. A
complete picture of all the variants of utilitarian
thinking would require volumes rather than pages. We direct our
attention to the forms of utilitarian thinking
found in the social sciences, particularly in the area of
family studies.
Among the varieties of philosophical utilitarian thinking
are voluntaristic, or interest, theories of value.
In these variants, great emphasis is placed on the
unfettered choice of individuals. One of the
J't FAMILY THEORIES Social Exchange and Choice
originators
of this perspective, Adam Smith, held an economic view of humankind based on the belief that people act
rationally to maximize benefits, or
utility. When choice was externally controlled or determined, however, actors could not make rational choices.
This view was the basis for
laissez-faire economics and, in addition, much of the utilitarian theory in the social sciences today.
In current social science, utilitarian thinking is quite
obvious in micro economic theory of the
family (Becker, 1981), social psychology (Emerson,
1976; Homans, 1961; Nye, 1979), organizational sociology (Blau, 1964), and rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990;
Hechter, 1987). There are major differences
of emphasis among these authors, especially
in how they unite individual motivation to macroscopic processes of reciprocity and social change. The focus of
all these theories is on the rational
utilitarianism of the individual, however.
Many of these theories have been termed exchange theories. This has led to some confusion with a
group of theories that are structural and not
at all focused on individual motivation. For example, the French anthropologists Claude Levi-Strauss (1969) and
Marcel Mauss (1954) are often called exchange
theorists, but their focus is on the institutional norm of reciprocity and the
social functions of exchanges in terms of group solidarity and
the formation of group alliances. Other
theorists, such as John Scanzoni (1970) and Randall Collins (1975), have a conflict—resource orientation; they only marginally
fit into our characterization of utilitarianism
because of their additional emphasis on macroscopic
structures. In the study of the family, utilitarian
thinking is generally referred to as exchange theory, and we follow this convention. However, it is certainly possible
to argue that patterns of human motivation are
responsible for the emergence of social
structures to regulate those motivations.
In the contemporary study of the family, Ivan Nye (1978,
1979, 1980) has been a foremost
proponent of exchange theory. Nye's (1979)
formal propositional statement of exchange theory relied heavily on the social-psychological approach of his
predecessors from psychology, Thibaut and Kelley
(1959). Although Nye's (1979) version of
utilitarianism does include the norm of reciprocity and group-level exchanges, these macrosocial concepts are not well
integrated with the social-psychological
utilitarianism that is his principal focus. Nye (1979)
titles his chapter "Choice, Exchange, and the Family," thus emphasizing the voluntarist assumption guiding his version
of utilitarianism. To date, Nye's
statement of utilitarianism applied to the family is
the most thorough and ambitious. Although there have been more recent summaries of exchange theory (Sabatelli &
Shehan, 1993), our characterization of the
core of the theory takes into account the thoroughness and
completeness of Nye's vision.
Focus and Scope Assumptions
The individual is real. The assumption that the individual ii real is technically referred to as methodological individualism. This assumption
implies that groupphenomena, social structure, and the normative culture are constructed by the actions of individualS.Thus,
if we understand th`e adidifsThf-itrdiViduals,
we will also understand these macrosocial phenomena. In regard to the family, this is an
important and perhaps tenuous assumption. In
exchange theory, the family is viewed-as -a-collection of
individuals. But we are all aware that mate selection, parenting, and many other family
matters are regulated by both formal norms (laws) and
informal ones. Regarding mate selection, for
example, laws in some jurisdictions forbid certain degrees of consanguinity, such as marriage with one's dead sister's
husband (e.g., Province of Manitoba). Clearly,
these laws are unjustified by contemporary
scientific understanding in genetics. How can these laws be understood solely as the result of the self-interest of
individual actors and their self-interested behavior? This is the task set by
the assumption of methodological
individualism. James S. Coleman (1990), in the first
chapter of his book Foundations of Social Theory, tackles this question
from a utilitarian, or exchange, perspective. We recommend his discussion as
supplying one of the best direct confrontations with the challenges of methodological individualism for the
study of social
groups and institutions.
Prediction and understanding come about by
understanding the individual actor's
motivation. Many theorists who assume
methodological individualism do not attempt to understand individuals' actions
through motivation. Those who hold utilitarian and microexchange perspectives usually do, however. Although these
theorists acknowledge that individuals are always
constrained in their choices, within these
constraints any choice can be understood as based on the actor's motivation rather than exogenous forces or constraints.
In this sense, exchange theory is a voluntaristic
theory in the same way in which Adam
Smith's theory was voluntaristic. This insight led Nye (1979) to state that the basic theory is about choice (p. 4).
Because families are a relatively long-lasting social
group, the voluntaristic assumption leads
exchange theorists to assume that families are rewarding to individual members.
The fact that children do not voluntarily choose their parents may provide some difficulties for the
theory, however.
Actors are motivated by
self-interest. Even with the assumption that
the actor's motivation explains behavior, a theorist could still assume
that motivation is multidimensional or not conscious (as in the
the actor's motivation explains behavior, a theorist could still assume
that motivation is multidimensional or not conscious (as in the
1AM1LY THEORIES Social Exchange and Choice .5/
concept of subconscious) or founded on inherent drives
such as those that Freud proposed. But
microutilitarian exchange theories usually include the assumption that
individuals are unilaterally motivated by self-interest;
individuals seek things and relationships they regard as beneficial for themselves. The notion of self-interest
raises some interesting questions regarding what we
commonly know asraCruis Even some variants of ethical
utilitarianism have been based on the assumption
that we should act to accrue the greatest. good for the greatest number. But for family exchange theorists such
as Nye (1979), collective interests and
altruism are derived and explained by the
self-interests Ofindividuals. So, although serf-interest is not necessariVilie-Falliaiarkof all forms of
utilitarian thinking, it is a basic assumption in regard to exchange and choice
theory.
Actors are rational. It is easy to agree with the
assumption that actors are rational. All of us like to
think that we are rational human beings. But how
often do we stop and think about what it means to be rational? This is a more complex assumption than we
initially might have thought.
To be rationalis to have the ability to calculate the ratio of
costs to rewards. This is an analytic
ability. One crucial dimenifon of rationality—Fs
that it is the same for all actors. Any two rational actors in identical situations with identical values and identical
information would necessarily reach the same
result in their calculations and thus pursue
the same behavior. This assumption of rational actors is as important for microeconomics as it is for choice and
exchange theory because it allows the
interchangeability of actors and the concept of general
rational actors captured in notions like "the consumer."
The idea of rational actors evolved from the rationalist
philosophies of the Age of Enlightenment.
Many students will recall that the Enlightenment
was characterized by a newfound confidence in the ability of humans to reason.
What was meant by reason was deduction or
analytic thought. Such analytic thinking was believed to be independent of experience or sense data. Many
philosophers, such as the French philosopher Rene Descartes, believed human
rationality provided unequivocal knowledge that
was true (quod erat demon-stratum). Indeed, the view of humans as rational actors originating
in the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as
John Locke provides much of the rationale for our
current legal system. For example, juvenile
offenders are treated differently from adults because they are believed to have not yet fully developed the ability to
calculate rewards and costs. The rational
assumption also provided the basis for much
of the economic theory of Adam Smith.
It is easy to confuse rationalism with other words that
share the same root but have very different
meanings. For instance, rational is
not interchangeable with rationalization. A rationalization is an attempt to provide an apparently rational justification for one's
behavior after the behavior occurred; it is not proof of a choice but rather a
fabrication after the fact. Later, we
further discuss the ex post facto nature of rationalization,
which critics of exchange theory raise as an objection.
Concepts s'
REWARD AND COST
A'reward is anything that is perceived as beneficial to
an actor's interests. A simple way to
conceptualize cost is as the inverse of reward.
It is possible to conceptualize "costs" as the negative dimension of rewards. It is also important, however, to
include as costs or negative rewards the opportunities
for rewards that might be missed or
foregone that are associated with any specific choice. It would be naive to assume that the concepts of costs and rewards
are unique to utilitarian theories. Certainly,
Watsonian and later Skinnerian psychology emphasizes rewards and
punishments. Although the basic notions
are similar, the theories differ because the assumption of rationality is largely absent from these psychological
theories. Indeed, behaviorists deny that conceptual
processes need to be included in explanations
of human behavior and posit that only behavioral patterns
of stimulus and response need be examined. This view is at odds with the
emphasis in exchange theory on rationality.
Microeconomics is focused on economic rewards
and costs. Exchange and choice theorists view
rewards and costs as being formulated from a much broader
array of values than is used in economic
theory. For example, Nye (1979), Blau (1964), and Foa and Foa (1980) each list six sources of rewards and costs,
although each list includes some different
sources. We consider these general sources of costs
and rewards in greater depth below.
When we examine the basic concept of rewards more deeply,
we find definitions referring to things or
relationships that bring pleasures, satisfactions, and
gratifications. Such definitions come uncomfortably
close to a naive hedonistic calculus weighing pleasure and pain. Such a hedonistic view falls apart rapidly when the
complexities of decisions are examined. For example, one may climb a mountain because it is gratifying, but it also involves risk and
hardship. Indeed, it is doubtful that mountain climbers would find the task as
gratifying if it did not contain the risk and
hardship. Many of our most gratifying
38 FAMILY
THEORIES
experiences
are gratifying in part because not everyone is willing to undertake the hardship or risk.
PROFIT OR
MAXIMIZING UTILITY
The notions of reward and cost alone do not explain
behavior. If one attempts to explain that an actor behaves in a certain way
because it is rewarding, the resulting explanation is overly simplistic and
fails to account for the many elements
that were rationally calculated by the actor. Indeed, reward and cost alone
supply us with little other than a form of behaviorism.
It is the concept of profit, or utility, that allows the
theory to avoid such criticisms. Profit is
defined as the ratio of rewards to costs for any
decision. Actors rationally calculate this ratio for all possible choices in a situation and then choose the action that
they calculate will bring the greatest rewards or
the least costs. Thus, the mountain climber
weighs the rewards of climbing a mountain, such as the social approval of other climbers and the aesthetic enjoyment of
the climb, against costs such as the risk of
being killed or injured in a rockfall or avalanche.
From this example, you can see that it is the notion of rational calculation of profit that makes exchange theory
more than naive hedonism.
COMPARISON LEVEL (CL) AND
COMPARISON LEVEL FOR ALTERNATIVES (CL+)
In complex situations, the evaluation of profit available
to an actor may be divided into two
comparison levels. The first is the comparison
(CL) of what others in your position have and how well you are doing relative to them. The second comparison
(CL+) is how well you are doing relative to others outside of your position but
in positions that supply an alternative or choice. For example, if instructors at your university were given a 3% raise in salaries,
they might ask how well they are doing relative to instructors at other
universities (CL). The second comparison
they might make is how well they are
doing relative to others in private enterprise and government with equivalent education and training (CL+).
The role
of comparisons in the evaluation of choices has mainly been emphasized by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Nye
(1979). This perceptual orientation is
especially useful for family researchers wanting to
explain phenomena such as timing of children or the decision to divorce. The decision to divorce provides a good
illustration of the two comparison levels. For example,
a husband may compare (CL)
Social Exchange and Choice 39
his profit ratio for his marriage with what he perceives
other husbands he knows are receiving in their marriages. The second level of
comparison (CL+) would be to compare his profit
as a husband with the profit he perceives in other
possible, unmarried positions, such as divorced
and remarried husbands. According to the theory, if he were to calculate
greater profit for an alternative position, he is more likely to choose a
divorce.
For family researchers, evaluation levels represent one of
the more attractive components of the theory
because they allow us to understand changes of marital and family
status. Comparison levels can be used to understand a choice such as divorce,
and they can also be used to understand the degree of satisfaction or
gratification an actor associates with an outcome. Sabatelli
and Shehan (1993) propose that the notion of comparison level
could help us understand why young couples
with children experience lower marital satisfaction than couples in other stages of family life (e.g., Rollins
& Feldman, 1970). Sabatelli and Shehan (1993) point
out that couples with young children are in a
period of family life that follows a stage (early marriage) marked by high satisfaction, thus constituting a high
comparison level. Demands and expectations
associated with child rearing take time and
energy away from fulfilling the high marital expectations in the way they were satisfied before children. Hence, the
comparison of present rewards with what one has
previously received is linked to greater
dissatisfaction with marriage.
RATIONALITY
We have previously discussed rationality as a basic
assumption necessary for the calculation of
the ratio of rewards to costs. If you think about things and relationships that
you find rewarding in your life, however, you will probably
notice that the value of these rewards changes
with time and situation. In addition, you would surely note that not all rewards are equally weighted. For example,
you might be thirsty and want a drink, but not
all liquids that would quench your thirst
are equally valuable (as any cola commercial attests). Furthermore, the value of a reward may decrease as you gain more
of it (marginal utility); a dollar to a rich
person has less value than a dollar to a poor
person. To deal with the changing value of rewards and costs, it is necessary
to add the idea of the importance, salience, or weight of alternatives. To understand any actor's choice as
rational, we need to know what the person considers
rewarding and costly, and, in addition, we have to know the
relative weights (or salience) for each • of the
rewards and each of the costs.
40 FAMILY THEORIES
A simple example might clarify this idea. Imagine that
your family is trying to decide on a destination
for a summer vacation. You have narrowed the choices down to
backpacking in the backcountry near Jackson Hole, Wyoming, or
visiting the campgrounds along the Oregon coast. To reach this
stage, each family member has to compare
the possible alternatives, such as taking individual vacations rather than a joint vacation. This is similar to the
second comparison level, or what Thibaut and Kelley (1959) called the
comparison level for alternatives. Is it a reward or cost to go on a family
vacation? Do you enjoy being together, or is it
more valuable to spend some time away from family members? After there is
agreement that a family vacation is more valuable, the next
step is to decide on the destination. Do you
value hiking in the mountains or walking miles of uncluttered beaches? Do you want the adventure of backpacking or the
more placid contentment of watching the Pacific
Ocean? Are there activities for all family members in both
spots? Each value, such as adventure and diversity of opportunities for other
family members, is weighted by the importance or salience of
this for you. Finally, you make a choice
based on the maximization of profit for you. Of course, your family as a whole
might choose the other alternative.
This example raises a critical question. How
could a researcher ever examine the complex decisions
of family members in one family, let
alone a large sample of families? Certainly, the theory appears too cumbersome for a detailed accounting of rewards, costs,
and relative weights for each individual, for
every decision in each and every family.
Exchange theory can be used in such investigations by making two assumptions. One assumption we have already
discussed: Because actors are rational, they are
interchangeable. This assumption means that
given the same rewards, costs, and weights, any actor would make the same choice as any other. The second assumption
is one we have not discussed in any detail.
It is the assumption that for large numbers of actors, we can assess the
rewards, costs, and weights as those that would be held by a
modal, or average, actor. In other words, we
assume that for most people in a social group or social system, rewards, costs, and weights are relatively uniform. There
may be variation in how people look at
rewards and costs, but there is great overall uniformity and little systematic
variation.
EXCHANGES AND EQUITY
The rational weighing of costs and rewards in an
unconstrained environment seldom happens in
reality. Usually, we live in a social
CA70,111
r1,aract-pri7Pri
hv cnrial interdenemiencies: some of the rewards Social
Exchange and Choice 41
we may desire are dependent on the
cooperation of others, or we may need to
trade with others something we have of lower. value in exchange for something of higher value. This is an
economic view of society. In most instances,
maximizing profit entails exchanges with others. Social relationships that last
over some period of time do so in part
because they offer profits. A rational person is willing to incur some losses to maintain such profitable relationships.
Marriage may be one such relationship, in which
inequities at one point in time are tolerated
because of the expectation of future rewards from the relationship. Certainly in families, vacations are planned
not so as to optimize the profit for any
individual but rather to distribute fairly and
equitably rewards to all family members.
In a few exchange perspectives (Scanzoni,
1972; Sexton & Perlman, 1989; Walster &
Walster, 1978), the principle of equity is viewed as
being central to the maintenance of social relationships and groups. After all, siblings play together because of a set
of negotiated and agreed-on exchanges perceived
by them to be a fair exchange. Families decide on a vacation spot
based not on any one individual's profit
but on an equitable distribution of rewards for all members. Husbands and wives can be viewed as in a fair exchange
situation, and when the situation becomes
unfair or imbalanced, we expect divorce
or separation. As we shall see later, marriages are seldom exactly equitable at any point in time, and some people
may be so committed to marriage that
inequity is not an issue. Indeed, if equity generally
operated in marriage, we would not have so much literature on division of household labor in the family (e.g., Pina
& Bengtson,
1993).
It is useful to keep in mind two precautions. First,
equity can be defined as "fairness" or
"justice," and relations do not need to be exactly equal to be fair or just but can be perceived to
be so. Social norms in a given place and time may
require inequality, such as women being
expected to subordinate their self-interests for the good of men and children.
So, it is possible that an unequal division of household labor is viewed as
fair or equitable. Second, rationality may not be uniform across social actors. A person cannot know how
rewarding or costly something is to others in a
group, or what comparison levels other group
members have, without adequate information and experience.
GENERALIZABLE SOURCES OF REWARDS
The concept of a set of general rewards and costs for
actors in a specific social system is absolutely necessary if exchange theory
is to be applied to groups and large
numbers of people and families. Of
FAMILY
THEORIES
course, some of the most interesting research questions
are not about one family or person but about why
people in general behave in a certain way. For instance, we may
want to know why married couples delay
childbearing or why people wait until their late 20s to get married. Examining why one person, say, Martha Jones, delayed
marriage would not give us the answer we
seek. Martha was hospitalized with a major
disease from her 20th birthday until she was 30 years old. We doubt that this explains why most people delay
marriage. The answer to our question would
usually come from representative survey research
using large numbers of respondents. If we attempt to explain our respondents' choices by maximization of profit, then
the question arises as to how we can compute
the ratio for all of these actors in our sample.
The notion of general sources of costs and rewards
enables us to compute a general accounting of
saliencies, costs, and rewards and to establish
a general choice that would be most profitable for actors in a social system.
Indeed, the relative stability of general costs and rewards in a social system allows actors to make rational
decisions. Various theorists have proposed
different general sources of rewards and
costs. Homans (1961) originally emphasized social approval as the most general source of rewards and costs. Other
theorists have felt a need for the inclusion of other
sources. Blau (1964) proposed the social
rewards and costs of personal attraction, social acceptance, social approval, instrumental services, respect, and
power. Foa and Foa (1980) proposed love, status,
services, goods, information, and money.
Nye (1979) proposed social approval, autonomy, predictability/ ambiguity, security, agreement, and equality of resources.
Nye makes the claim that many of these
sources are culture free and may be used anywhere
in the world, but he fails to tell us which ones have such universal generalizability. None of the exchange theorists
have spent their energies addressing general
salience weights for these general costs and
rewards, but in specific applications they usually make an argument as to why one set of rewards or costs is more
salient than another. Because salience may
change dramatically with the situation, the
question is perhaps best left open at the general theoretical level.
Because most social exchange theorists identify social
approval as a reward or cost, we can use that
source for a general example. Let's return to the question "Why do people
delay marriage?" and see what kind of answer we can formulate according to
exchange theory, using the broad category of social approval for rewards and
costs. We must first postulate the profit linked
to marriage. In North America, most people marry at least once. According to
exchange theory, a rational actor would marry to maximize
profit. We must all agree that marriage
Social Exchange and Choice 43
is socially approved more than alternative forms of
relationships such as cohabitation, singlehood, and so
on. Our parents, religious institutions,
and political institutions view marriage as the appropriate relationship between coresident heterosexual adults.
It is not difficult to make the argument that social
approval is one of the major reasons we marry. Why
are young people delaying marriage? Very simply, marriage
roles and responsibilities (especially pregnancy
and child care) interfere with the social approval attached to other early life course expectations such as finishing
education and getting started in a career.
Today, as opposed to only a few decades ago,
these educational and work expectations apply to both men and women. as sources of social approval. Thus, young men and
women delay marriage so that they may
first achieve these other socially approved
statuses. After all, most of us had parents, teachers, and clergy who advised us to finish our education and get a
job before getting married. Although there
are many gaps in our explanation, it
nonetheless serves to illustrate the way in which general sources of reward might be used to explain social patterns such as delay
of
marriage.
Propositions
Exchange theorists explain individual and family phenomena
by identifying general propositions that seem to
cover the particular phenomenon of interest. This is, of
course, the procedure for all deductive theories.
In the case of exchange theory, the number of general propositions required for any explanation are few. According to
theory, social phenomena can be explained with
little conceptual and propositional baggage.
When a theory leads to successful explanations with very little baggage, we call it parsimonious. This simplicity is seen as an asset in comparing competing theories. Let's examine the
propositions called for in exchange theory.
Actors in a situation will choose
whichever behavior maximizes profit.
The simplest and most powerful proposition in exchange
theory is simply that an actor will
choose the course of action that offers the greatest
rewards relative to costs. One implication of this proposition 9. is that
actors may not necessarily choose options that provide the greatest rewards if the costs are high relative to costs
associated with other choices. A less rewarding
option may be selected because the • costs
are lower. This fact should caution us that unlike the case in
44 FAMILY
THEORIES Social
Exchange and Choice 45
behaviorism, in exchange theory profit rather
than reward determines behavioral
choices.
Actors in a situation in which there are no rewards seek to
minimize costs (principle of least costs).
Some of you might ask, What if there are only potential
costs in a situation and no rewards? The
theory actually incorporates this concern but
in an implicit rather than explicit way. Implicit in exchange theory is the concept of reward and cost being interchangeable
because of the notion of calculation of
profit. If profit is the ratio of rewards
divided by costs, then clearly a fraction results when costs exceed rewards. Because division is the same operation as
subtraction (the dividend is how many times
you can subtract the denominator from the
numerator), we can see that costs are mathematically equivalent to negative rewards. Indeed, a cost is a negative
reward. Implicitly, then, the proposition
regarding maximization of profit becomes
the minimization of costs. This rule, or proposition, about minimization of costs can then be applied to the special
case in which there are zero rewards but
different costs associated with choices.
One of the more vexing problems for exchange theory has
been the computation of long-term costs and rewards
versus short-term costs and rewards. We give up many
immediate rewards to achieve long-term rewards. For example,
those who believe that a university education has the purpose of getting a good
job might sacrifice 4 years of income while they are in a
university, and many other immediate rewards,
for what they perceive as higher rewards after they graduate. In a marriage, one spouse might pass up the satisfaction
of making an angry response to an affront from
the other spouse for the marriage to last
over the longer term.
Compared with school groups and work groups,
families are relatively lengthy in duration. The
analysis of long-term rewards and costs is
essential to understanding the behavior of its members. We can extrapolate two general propositions in this regard
from Nye (1979, p. 6):
When
immediate profits are equal, then actors choose according to which
alternative provides the most profit in the long term.
and
When long-term profits are equal, then one chooses the
alternative that provides the most profit in the short term.
These two
propositions allow us to gain some perspective on the calculation of profit by interjecting time as a
complicating variable. We still have to add the relative salience to the actor
of immediate rather than deferred
gratification. And of course, these propositions tend to
provide guidelines for analysis rather than predictions, as it is doubtful that we would often encounter situations in which
profits are equal.
The
propositions in this section suggest that exchange theory is deterministic. If we knew all of the values and salience
weights composing an actor's calculations,
we could accurately predict the actor's
choice and behavior in any given situation. The only obstacle to such accurate predictions would be errors in our
measurements, which might lead us to speak in
probabilities rather than necessities. Nonetheless,
this is a causal perspective in which the actor's perceptions, values, and calculation of profit compose the
causal variables and the actor's choice and
behavior are the effect variables. As a result of this
strongly deterministic view, exchange theorists might, for example, argue that those actors, who choose to get
married calculate that marriage is more rewarding
than remaining single.
If people are
basically selfish (motivated by self-interest), how is social
order possible? In particular, how can family members cooperate,
live in harmony, and invest themselves in each others' welfare? Exchange
theorists tend to argue that individuals learn to increase the
profits of others in order to increase their own profits. Thus, relationships
become bargaining processes, each party exchanging rewards
valued by other parties. Bargaining can eventually lead to "contracts,"
or promises by each to mutually reward the other at acceptable
costs to both. Over time, trust and commitment develop out
of fair exchanges. We trust that the rewards we give to others will be reciprocated in
due course, and we commit to enduring investment costs for the moment
with the assurance that relationship partners will repay our
investment. When a group such as a family has a stabilized
pattern of exchanges, such that commitment, trust, and profit are
operating to the mutual benefit of all, then a spokesperson for the group
can engage in exchanges with spokespersons of other groups. So
macro exchanges can be viewed as the bargaining process between or
among groups.
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